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CONCORDIA SEMINARY LIBRARY
ST. LOUIS. MISSOURI

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
That there has been a wealth of material written and presented to
modern students of theology regarding the question of religious language
and its place in the field of New Testament Theology there can be no denial. But to say that this material has been always useful and intelligible to those undertaking the task of finding a significant relationship between the meaning of religious assertions and their use within
the complex of human language is something less likely to be affirmed.
Human language is a very comple;c thing. And it has no doubt fascinated
man ever since he realized that he was a creature who could verbally
symbolize and express in many ways the thoughts taking place in his own
mind. That these thoughts were understood by other men or that communication always was taking place is another question. The fact remains,.
man is a social animal. And as such his thinking, feelings and speaking
do not take shape within a vacuum. Moreover, the very form of his words
and the very content of his speech are delimited by the conditions of
his environment and his historical existence in time.
Admittedly, human language is a thing which escapes easy definition.
But that does not hinder us from using it in our daily lives. The fact
that man is both a thinking and a speaking creature is for all purposes
a truism; but the more profound fact is that human language and human
existence are intrinsically related. And this relationship becomes even
more remarkable once we realize that it demonstrates and reflects the
tremendous creative hand of Almighty God.
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Moreover, the fact that human language can give expression to God's
creation and His Love in the form of words will always remain a mystery.
But we can speak about God. We do have the power to communicate the
Gospel of Jesus Christ and we also have the power to understand that
Good News when it is being expressed to us. But how is this communication
possible? How is it that we understand the words we hear or read regarding the activity of the Triune God? Do these words carry some hidden
power all their own? Or are they just ordinary words which have taken
on some special meaning and thrust? Furthermore, what is the relationship between the use of religious language and the form of other kinds
of languages? And if there is a form of religious language, what is its
place within the framework of theological studies? Is there a list of
criteria which help us to examine and explain the meaning and use of
religious expressions? These questions and others like them have been
nosited and (to some degree) answered by philosophers and theologians for
quite some time. And especially to students of New Testament Theology
these questions are becoming increasingly significant. This, then, is*
the purpose of this study: to look more closely at what scholars in many
fields have had to say regarding the matter of human language and its
ability to make religious assertions. In an attempt to define this purpose more accurately, it will be necessary to: (a) examine the field of
contemporary Linguistic Analysis in light of its historical setting;
(b) describe the relationship between the phenomenology of language and
religious language; (c) consider the work being done presently in the
area of modern linguistic studies in biblical research and see its effect
upon the formation of theological assertions; (d) present the opinions
of those scholars who discuss the very nature of theological language;
and (e) investigate St. Paul's meaning and use of religious language.
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This outline may appear to be quite, challenging. We would agree
that to consider all the intricacies of all the areas would result in
a tome far beyond the scope of this study. But that does not mean that
the material cannot be handled in limited space. Indeed the material
must be discussed. As Stephen Neill maintains:
We have . . . a vast amount of lexical and grammatical material
at our disposal. Are we sure that the best use is being made of
this material, and that the linguistic principles which underlie
much current work of interpretation are reliable and genuinely
scientific? Have New Testament studies taken adequate advantage
of the general progress in the sphere of "linguistics" and "semantics", the theory of speech and of the nature of communication
between human beings?1
We do have a plethora of material at our disposal. But it is one thing
to acknowledge this fact and it is yet another to make this information
intelligible to modern man. Modern men have very different views about
history and historical processes. It has often been said that we cannot
really tell our people what it was like back in First Century Christianity because times were so different. This is the problem of continuity
which has beset the minds of many New Testament scholars. The problem
may be expressed:
In our age . . . we live in a universe of thought and discourse
radically different from that of the first century. How, then,
is it possible to transmit to people of today a message rooted in
an era which looked at the world in quite another way? What does
it take to translate words spoken and written long ago into terms
and concepts which might be comprehensible to people living some
1,900 years later?2
That question is not easily answered. But at least it can be answered
with some degree of sureness once the matter of religious language is
discussed. The challenge must be taken up by serious students of New
Testament Theology who are concerned about the present attitudes of
religious skepticism so common in our society today. "In an important
sense ours is an age in desperate search for meaning.

Meaning by
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definition must have language as its basic medium."3 Paul Van Buren
takes up this challenge and also offers what he hopes to be a viable
solution:
In an era in which men are being called to patriotism, nationalism, racial superiority, and the preservation of economic systems
and various ways of life, in the name of religion, "God," the
church, and all that is "holy," the clarification of the language
of faith and of the Gospel by means of linguistic analysis is much
needed. The chief benefactor of this clarification is the empirJenny-minded man who has been touched by the Gospel and who seeks
a meaning and a logic to being a Christian in the world today."
Thus Van Buren and others like him are convinced that the only
sure way to understand the Gospel today as well as give it life and
meaning in a world hungry for meaningful expressions is to see that
Gospel in light of Linguistic Analysis. For language "is to be conceived of not as an abstraction but as a concrete activity of speaking
men."5
This, then, should give the reader some idea of the attitudes of
some theologians who are decidedly concerned about the challenge of
modern man's search for meaning in life and religion. How well this
challenge is met through the efforts of those championing the method
of Linguistic Analysis has yet to be observed.

CHAPTER II
CONTEMPORARY LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS AND ITS
RELATIONSHIP TO NEW TESTAMENT THEOLOGY
Modern Linguistic Analysis has its roots in both the school of
Logical Positivism and the school of Phenomenology. The former had
its beginnings in Vienna and later became centered at Oxford University.
The latter1 with its focus upon existentialism was centered in France
and Germany. For both schools of thought language was the central
issue. Moreover, both schools maintained an opposition against all
forms of "ideal" languages. Both said: "Meaning does not exist in an
ideal realm of perfect clarity and distinctness, apart from and antedating the ambiguous domain of ordinary usage.112 In other words, "no
word has a single meaning as its essence. Words have meanings, depending upon the context of their usage.° This philosophical opposition
really stemmed from a dissatisfaction with the idealism of Plato,
Leibnitz, Husserl and others who would say, "language is composed of signs
that point the mind to ideal meanings,"1 as well as against the empiricism
of Locke, Hume and others who would say, "words refer to meanings outside
themselves, to concepts."5 What these schools of thought both maintain,
in brief, is that meaning is not detached from words and that words are
not signs that refer elsewhere for their meaning. Rather, meaning is
correlative to the speaker in the act of speaking and the writer in the
act of writing.
It would be helpful to look more closely at the background to
contemporary Linguistic Analysis as it is really an outgrowth of Logical
Positivism. There actually have been many variant forms of. Logical
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Positivism since its inception in 1929 as an outgrowth of the Vienna
Circle formed by Moritz Schlick in 1922. Logical Positivism or Logical
Analysis is quite different from Linguistic Analysis, which itself is
considerably less empirically oriented. The old Vienna Circle, which
broke up after World War II, argued that "there was one thing all
sciences had in common that could be delimited: language."6 But it is
a well known thing that philosophers long before the time of the Vienna
Circle had likewise been interested in the matter of language, but not
to the scientific degree as were the followers of Schlick. One very
notable figure, however, to come out of that school of thought was
Ludwig Wittgenstein who really represents the bridge between the old
Logical Positivism and the form of Philosophical Analysis which was beginning to form around the year 1936. Van Buren states that:
Linguistic analysis, although it is related historically to the
Logical Positivism of the Vienna Circle of the 1920's, should
not be confused with the somewhat dogmatic spirit and teachings
of that philosophy.? Indeed, its deepest roots lie in the tradition of British empiricism. It is more accurate to speak of
linguistic analysis as a method than a school or movement of
philosophy, for what its practitioners share is only a common
interest and a common logical method. Their interest is in the
function of language, and their method lies in the logical analysis of how words and statements function, both in normal and in
abnormal use. Linguistic analysts are not opposed in principle
to the use of relg3gious or theological language, as the logical
positivists were.
To be sure, the Logical Positivists were a hard-headed group of philosophers who demanded much from the spoken and written word. For them
any forms of emotive language were held in suspicion and anything short
of scientific verification was not acceptable. We would have to agree
with David Crystal who says, "there is no possibility of compromise
between logical positivism and religion."9
Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) presented a refreshing change from
the coldly analytic Positivism to a more appealing linguistic method.
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Unlike the early Wittgenstein who manifested many of the philosophical
tendencies of the old Vienna Circle, the later Wittgenstein of the
Philosophical Investigations (1945-1949) made it clear
that one cannot lay down in advance that one kind of language is
meaningful and other kinds nonsense, but that one must recognize
that there are many kinds of languages, and that the meaning of
each is to be studied from the way in which it gets used.1°
But this does not mean, for instance, "that the philosophical movement
stemming from Wittgenstein has suddenly become more friendly towards
the claims of theological or religious language."11 But what it does
mean is that "theological language is no longer summarily dismissed as
nonsense.II12
Wittgenstein himself said: "It is interesting to compare the multiplicity of the tools in language and of the ways they are used . . with
what logicians have said about the structure of language."13 Moreover,
"For a large class of cases -- though not for all -- in which we employ
the word 'meaning' it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its
use in the language."14 And again, "One cannot guess how the word functions. One has to look at its use and learn from that."15 Finally,
"Language is an instrument. Its concepts are instruments."16 The matter
of use has always been a pivotal term for the linguistic analyst. As
Crystal states:
Moreover, if meaning is ultimately determined by use, and use
resides in the users, then the beliefs of the users are obviously
going to be an important part of the total 9Antext which must be
considered before language can be assessed.'(
Dallas High says much the same kind of thing: "the most important feature is that language is always intimately connected with the user."18
In addition to rejecting the notion of the possibility of a private
language, Wittgenstein would maintain that language is a form of life.19

(01.

It is to be observed that the phrase "form of life" is used to denote
life as a whole, not some sort of psychological fragmentation as
if feelings, attitudes, or poetic expressions were antithetical
to logic, reason, mathematics, and science. . . . Rather, a
"form of life" is embodied in the language-using situations. .
.stressing the intimate bond between man (persons)
This. .
Po
and language.'
Still another helpful concept supplied by Wittgenstein is that of
"family resemblances."21 This concept plays a very important role in
the understanding of the New Testament Gospel. In the words of Van
Buren:
If no family resemblances were allowed between the language of
the Gospel and the way in which we speak of being loved by
another human being, we should have to abandon all hope of
understanding what the Gospel means. But languages do have
family resemblances, and it is by noticing them as well as by
seeing thr limits that we can understand the language of
theology.
We remember Crystal's statement in which he asserted that Logical
Positivism and religion are not in the least compatible; but at the same
time we should be reminded of the fact that Linguistic Analysis and
religion are compatible in a number of ways.

First, Linguistic Analysis

would agree that "there is a multiplicity of languages."23 Secondly,
Linguistic Analysis, unlike Logical Positivism, has a "distrust of reductionism"24 and tends to move away from the language of physics.
Thirdly, the followers of the Later Wittgenstein would say that within
all languages there is indeed a "diversity of meaning."25 It is to be
seen that these three points have much in common. Most important is
the fact that we are made aware of the wide range of possibilities for
meaningful discourse. Following this, the Linguistic Analysts would
say that there is room for "indirect discourse"26 within the realm of
intelligibility, i.e., there can be such a thing as language which is
not really emotive but still has some level of empirical worth (e.g.,

parabolic language, symbolic language, and the like). Finally, the
Linguistic Analytic method would stress very heavily the matter of the
"context of the situation."27 Yet is this saying the whole story?
Surely there is much of worth in these statements:regarding the harmony
between Linguistic Analysis and the use of religious language. But what
about the whole matter of truth? Can this be tested? Some analysts
would say that it can:
Some means must then be contrived in order to test whether language
and understanding do in fact have reference to reality, whether
they are "true!". . . . Philosophy . . . endeavors to discover
criteria appropriate to various forms of discourse. Thi§otype
of philosophy is known as functional linguistic analysis.
And where are these criteria to be located? "Contemporary linguistic
philosophy accepts as fundamental the principle: the proper locus of
meaning is the proposition or statement."29 The statement or the proposition, then, is the primary locus in which the criteria for understanding are most evident. Said another way, the meaning of a word is
decided by the context in which it is used. Herein lies the heart of
the verification principle for the Linguistic Analyst. That is,
the meaning of a statement is to be found ini and is identical
with, the function of that statement. If a statement has a
function,. so that it may in principle be verified or falsified,
the statement is meaningful, and unless or until a theological
statement can be submitted in some way to verification, it cannot be said to have a meaning in our language-game. This means
that the context of the language of faith may not be neglected"
This, then, is the kind of thing Ferre has in mind when he says that
"we must abandon the closely circumscribed techniques of verificational
analysis and search for a style of linguistic analysis which can better
appreciate the extraordinary variety of the functions of language."31
Although he is not among the majority of scholars in the field of
Linguistic Analysis, Langdon Gilkey expresses a profound caution to
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those who would glibly assent to the verification principle as it is
put forth by Van Buren and others. Gilkey contends that Linguistic
Analysis and biblical theology can get together only if we see that
"such an analysis of Church language must. . . accept the language of
the Church as 'given' and therefore also its faith as 'give:11.02
Moreover,"hy its nature, linguistic analysis cannot move beyond this
churchly scene to relate religious language to ordinary experience."33
He goes on to say that it would take an optimist to maintain that religious discourse "when used in the churches, communicates meaningfully
to those who use and those who hear it."34
In much the same way as Gilkey, the British scholar Crystal would
assert that Linguistic Analysis is quite useful but one must constantly
be aware of its drawbacks. He writes:
No matter how much linguistic perfectibility was attained, there
could still be only an inadequate knowledge of God for a human
being. Secondly, what possible verifiable criterion could one
set up for deciding when language has expressed a metaphysical
truth best of all? . . . Thirdly, and most important, an overconcentration on language form in religious matters involving
fundamental truths is bad, because no ;mount of stylistic knowledge will eradicate a confused mind.3
Here Crystal is arguing against those who would say that language is
the prime conveyor of meaning irrespective of the whole context of
belief. Said another way, language is really too inadequate to speak
about God who far transcends the limits of human discourse; but language
is in fact all we have got. So we had better make the most of it. In
another place, Crystal contends that
it is quite helpful to look on language as a kind of indispensable
tool, which many scholars, Christian and otherwise, would do well
to understand better. To make it a fundamental criterion for
living, however, is to get one's priorit4es wrong. Language makes
a good servant, but it is a bad master.,
°
At the other end of the spectrum is John Macquarrie who would
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maintain that there are at least three areas in which theologians might
profit from the work being done by contemporary linguistic philosophers.
The first of these areas in the self-criticism of theology itself.
. . . A second area . . . is the field of biblical theology. . . •
A third area . . . the work of logical analysis . . . can make its
contribution toward the construction of a new philosophical theology.3(
Perhaps this is the kind of thing which Woelfel has in mind when he
writes that sooner or later Christian rationalism and metaphysics will
have to move beyond their present status and "incorporate their insights
into a more profound synthesis."38
If there is to be any kind of synthesis forthcoming it will of necessity have to confine itself at first to the matter of language itself.
For it would stand to reason that for both Christian theologians and
Linguistic Analysts alike the focal point of agreement would be that
centering on an adequate methodology. That methodology would be confined to the relationship between theological assertions and ordinary
language.39 Whether this can be fully achieved, i.e., that both theology and philosophy could decide upon a common language, is another
question. In any event, at least prior consideration must be given to
the feasibility of such an inclusive language, a language which would
participate on the same level of discourse. But is such a language
possible? In one of his more recent studies on the subject, Langdon
Gilkey writes: "Clearly there is no special vocabulary or 'language'
in religion; what, then, are the peculiar usages and rules of applicartion that make ordinary words • . . 'religious' in character?"

This

is no idle question. And one possible answer lies in the fact that
both theology and philosophy alike should not overlook or in any way
disparage the meaningfulness of the language of faith.

For it this

language of faith which has a function that could be clarified by

•
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Linguistic Analysis. And at the same time Linguistic Analysis must
realize that "the language of Christian faith is the language of a
believer, one who has been 'caught' by the Gospel."41 Moreover, the
Linguistic Analyst must be made aware that "a believer is speaking and
the circumstances in which he is speaking may not be ignored. The actual function of the words is the key to understanding the language of
faith."42
Thus in light of what many scholars in both fields have had to say,
there is beginning to come about a strong appreciation for each other's
stylistic tendencies and linguistic methodology. But before we consider
the common realm of theological and philosophical discourse it will be
necessary to discuss another branch of philosophy which has made substantial inroads into the matter of New Testament language.

CHAPTER III
PHENOMENOLOGY OF LANGUAGE AND ITS
RELATIONSHIP TO RELIGIOUS LANGUAGE
Although they look at language in much the same way, "phenomenology
of language is not a kind of linguistic analysis.ol That is, Linguistic
Analysis, at least in form of verificational analysis, operates with the
law of the single perspective, while "the phenomenology of language
takes the view that language participates in the creation, preservation,
and modification of the appearances."2 Said another way, "Linguistic
Analysis of the functional variety seeks to discriminate among the manifold ways in which language is actually used."3 However, the phenomenology of language "attempts to press language for its ontological bearings.
That is, Linguistic Analysis seeks to investigate the uses of language,
while the phenomenology of language attempts to examine the various
"modes of language.0
It goes without question that the recent developments in New Testament Theology, especially in the area of hermeneutics, have largely been
affected by the philosophy of Martin Heidegger. As one of his most notable students, Heinrich Ott, has said,
it is under the influence of Martin Heidegger that the problem of
language has most recently entered into theological discussion.
There are today several theologians who have rec9gnized the theological significance of the problem of language.
James Robinson maintains that "for Heidegger, the term language (Snrache)
does not merely designate audible or verbal articulation. It is more
basically related to the conveying of meaning."7 This matter of the
relationship between the ontological basis of language and New Testament
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Theology will be discussed in more detail under the area of the New
Hermeneutic. Before this is done, it would be well to consider some
of the later Heidegger's thoughts on language. Ott claims that for
Heidegger
(a) language is not to understood in terms of its sign function . . . simply its phonetic symbols; (b) language is not to
be understood in terms of its expressive function; (c) language
is a 'transcendental' . . . event that overtakes man and in
which man is allowed to participate: 'language speaks'; (d) the
'dimension of the object' must also be considered. Our understanding of the text does not proceed simply between two points,
ourselves and the text being apprehended. . . . It is not the
If we wish to under'opinions' of the author that count. .
stand at all, then our concern must rather be with the relation
of the past thinker to the object confronting hm, an object
which must be capable of becoming ours as well.
Ott himself has "undertaken the specific task of mediating between
Bultmann and Barth on the basis of Heidegger."9
Thus it should become increasingly evident that the phenomenology
of language has indeed played a significant role in German schools of
thought regarding the language of the New Testament. For it was on the
basis of the existential quality implicit in phenomenology that
Rudolf Bultmann and his students, Gerhard Ebeling and Ernst Fuchs gave
impetus to what is today referred to as the New Hermeneutic.
On language, Fuchs can be compared with the later Heidegger in that
both maintain that "only that which can become present as language is
real. For 'where meaning is, there also is language. And where language
is, there is reality' ."1° There is, then, a decided correspondence between language and hermeneutics. As the Roman Catholic scholar, Luis
Alonso-Sch?kel has said, "understanding language is an act of hermeneutics."11 He also said that we can consider language to be operating on
three levels. First, "as the human faculty of speech (language);
secondly, as a concrete language (langue); and thirdly in its personal

15
use (parole) -- we shall discover in all three an interpretive function."12 Thus for him language has a hermeneutical function. Language
does not, however, repeat unchanged external reality, "nor does it simply carry to the exterior the interior realities of man. Language is
itself a complex hermeneutic activity on several levels."13 Despite
this emphasis upon the interpretative character implicit in human language there is still the question of understanding that needs to be resolved. For that is the focal question in contemporary hermeneutics:
how does the language of the Scripture become meaningful for Twentieth
Century man? Ott has stated the problem thus:
what is understanding, and how does a given text become intelligible? The problem of language asks: What is the nature of language, and how, duo modo, does a given text speak (to us)? TIT two
problems converge; in fact, they are both finally identical.1*
This, then, is the problem to which the German scholars Ebeling and
Fuchs wiriressed themselves.
Basically, the New Hermeneutic is characterized by those scholars
who are interested in the connection between current philosophical-theological problems of method and the actual exegesis of the New Testament'
texts. The kind of problem with which they are confronted has been very
well summarized by Martin Scharlemann.
An awareness of the historical distance between text and interpreter, induced by life in a world of rapid movement into the future,
has created the need to distinguish sharply between what a Biblical
passage once meant and what it signifies today. With the many textual, grammatical, and lexicographical tools available today, it is
a comparatively simple task to determine what a Scriptural passage
once meant. It is much more difficult to transpose that meaning
into the contemporary situation, because of the size of the gap
which has grown out of our moving into a new kind of univer%.1-)
The New Hermeneuticians are thus most concerned with providing a link
between what was once said and how that same thing can be said today.
Their analysis of a Biblical text provides (hopefully) a better understanding
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of, and a keener insight into, the reality of modern manes existence.
For them, "hermeneutic is basically etrans-lation,e meaning the transportation of the subject matter from then to now, as the event of language in the past speaks in our language today. 6

Here it is to be

observed that the New Hermeneuticians indeed place much emphasis upon
the matter of language as an event. But where it would appear that these
scholars could help us the most, they have only succeeded in making the
issue more confused. This language as event is much like language itself: difficult to define. As Robinson writes: "Neither verificational
analysis nor the theory of language as an arbitrary system of signs and
symbols is prepared to cope with the notion of ... . language as event."17
In spite of the efforts of the New Hermeneuticians, their description of
the language of Scripture is fraught with many difficulties. Dallas
High appears to have sounded the knell when he writes:
Even though there is a certain justification for representing
language as "event" . . . nevertheless this may well be more of
an abstraction of language and words, as if to claim that words
themselves are the events, or could perform these events. ... .
It is to w hdraw language from its personal backing and human
condition.it
The question of interpretation of the text for modern man, however,
is still a very important one. If the New Hermeneuticians could not
find an adequate answer to the problem,the young scholar David Crystal
maintains that a viable solution can be found within the area of Linguistic Analysis. It is evident that hermeneutics aims to discover and expound the true meaning of scriptural language. Hermeneutics also
involves the three stages of noemantics (the determination of
the possible senses of Scripture), heuristics (the determination
of the true meaning by a known set of rules), and proohoristics
(the explanation of the text to others). The practical utiliza..
tion of interpretative procedures is known as exegesis.19
He further asserts that "as such problems begin in language, and end
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with the verification of the meaning of that language, linguistics should
be able to provide valuable assistance."20
With this brief look at the relationship of the phenomenology of
language to religious language we have seen that the former has really
only succeeded in clouding the issue due to its emphasis upon the ontological quality of human language. That there is a definite correlation between human language and human existence goes without saying.
But to lay too heavy an emphasis upon the role of human existence is
to enter into the realm of metaphysics; and the role of philosophical
categories and abstruse world-views is not the intention of this study.
Our concern is chiefly that of the understanding of New Testament language in light of Linguistic Analysis. A very similar attitude, although
taken by a man in a somewhat different area, is one expressed by James
Barr. His concern is that
though frequent mention will be found of "the problem of language" or "the phenomenon of human language", the questions which
have been discussed in this kind of hermeneutics have not been
linguistic questions, although occasional reference may be ma i
to linguistic facts; but philosophical-theological questions.
It is now to the question of linguistics that we turn our attention.

CHAPTER IV
MODERN LINGUISTICS AND SEMANTICS AND
THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO NEW TESTAMENT LANGUAGE
No better introductory words could be found to this particular section than those expressed by James Barr: "by studying language linguistically one is- making a genuine and valid contribution to the understanding of it."1 But who is such a person? Is it one who examines language
in terms of grammatical and syntactical constructions in hopes of elucidating the meaning contained within the sentence structure? Surely,
studies of this nature are valuable for students of foreign and domestic
languages. Or is it more than simply lexicographical and semantic disciplines that are needed? Can it be that the minutia of sentence elements
must give way to a broader concept of contextual criticism which emphasizes a less restrictive meaning sometimes at the expense of the finer
points of grammar? Or is it possible that some kind of synthesis can
be worked out between both schools of thought? The purpose of this chapter, then, is to look more closely at the types df concepts which distinguish each school of thought from the other. In this manner it will
help us to see those differing points of view of the linguist, the semanticist and the lexicographer and how these viewpoints affect the study of
New Testament theology.
In the words of William Smalley, the New Testament linguist
doesn't see Greek as some kind of fixed language ideal for the
presentation of Christian teaching, but as a language among languages, with its niceties and its ambiguities, its vagueness and
its preciseness, a product of its history and its culture. The
linguistic point of view does not see all the meanings of a Greek
word in every occurrence 21' that word but sees meanings selected
and delimited by context.
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This kind of thinking has a valid place in the area of Bible translation. Here we can see both elements, i.e., grammatical constructions
and contextual nuances, are essentially at work. On the surface,
Smalley's words appear to make a good deal of sense. But before we nod
our heads in final affirmation to his description of the cult of New
Testament linguists, it would be wise to consider some of the more profound and scholarly remarks of some other students of biblical theology.
We are told that "semantics empinges upon theology at many levels,"3
and that "one cannot build a sound theology upon an unsound use of language.ai. What, then, is the way to build a sound theology? It has been
suggested that it "cannot be conclusively stated in Biblical terms,"5 and
that we must turn to outside sources for more information. What are
these sources? The tone of this present study would seem to indicate that
Linguistic Analysis could provide us the answer. But to this opinion Barr
would issue a caution:
If it is true that modern philosophy (of which I have only an amateur knowledge) lays much emphasis on the examination of everyday language, it may be that we have here a point at which the
isolation of biblical theology from such philosophy within the
intra-biblical area is a source of much harm.°
Yet he is willing to modify his position somewhat in maintaining that
the most reliable use of biblical language will be that in which "ample
and unambiguous evidence from usage leads us to suppose that we use a
word in a way that adequately conveys a deliberate and conscious purpose
. . . in the sentences spoken or written by the men of the Bible."7
Such an expression might very well play into the hands of the contemporary Linguistic Analyst who can see much of his own point of view
reflected in the words of the sematicist, Barr. But Barr's concerns
are not wholely centered about the ambitions of the Linguistic Analyst.
His main interest is in pointing out the deficiences of certain biblical
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lexicographers whose idealist philosophy adversely affects their accuracy. To Barr, these idealists say the linguistic structure of the
biblical text is "an expression of, and reflects the inner relations of,
the relevant thought-structure, Greek-metaphysical or Hebrew-theological."8 Moreover, they are unable to "keep to linguistic method strictly and the tendency to replace it by theological and philosophical argument."9 And to make matters worse, they are unable to "see and present evidence except where it appears to follow the lines of a thoughtFor Barr, too little
structure of metaphysical-theological type."10
concern is given whether or not it is the thought or the language of the
Greek or Hebrew in particular or the Indo-Etropean or Semitic in general.
In his opinion.
The contrast of Greek and Hebrew cultures and languages has its
value because of the relation of the two in the New Testament;
and also for its importance for us in disentangling the different threads in our culture since the beginning of the Christian
era.11
David Crystal also finds a similar problem in analyzing Greek using one
linguistic theory and Hebrew using another. Moreover, there is a tend-'
ency for some lexicographers to find parallels between dissimilar languages which are not there and to overlook those which are present.
One ought to note the closeness of thought between Barr's criticism
and that of Crystal.
The derivation of a word is irrelevant for determining the current
meaning of a word at any given time. . . . Appeals to etymology are
dramatic, but irrelevant; the "basic" or "correct" meaning of a
word depends on a statistical survey of its uses, not in what it
used to mean or what one individual thinks it ought to mean.12
But who are these individuals who make the decisions regarding the mean
ing of certain biblical words? And who are those who impose their
particular thought-structure upon the meaning of biblical material? We
now inspect those who may be guilty in the eyes of Barr and Crystal.

21
In the year 1886 the noted German scholar, Hermann Cremer, made the
following remark: "Lexical works upon New Testament Greek have hitherto
lacked a thorough appreciation of what Schleiermacher calls 'the language
moulding power of Christianity'."13 Furthermore he maintained that "the
terms hackneyed and worn out by the current misuse of daily talk received
a new impress and fresh power."14 Barr would contend that where Cremer
says "new impress," Gerhard Kittel, the editor of the famed Theological
Dictionary of the New Testament,15 uses the phrase, "new content."16
Thus, in Barr's opinion,
the "old" is the Hellenic-Hellenistic thinking associated with
the words, the "new" is the Hebraic-Christian stream of thought,
which itself is ancient but when expressed in Greek creates a
"new content" for the words of that language.17
It would be well to consider a quote from one of Kittel's lectures given
in the year 1938.
The language of the New Testament has quite definitely but one
single purpose, that of expressing that which has taken place,
that which God has done in Christ. New Testament words are
thus essentially like a mirror; they reflect the fact of Christ,
and this they do not in any broken or indirect way, but in actual
reality and in genuine truth. That which hag taken place in
Christ, itself and through its own dynamis,-4° creates and shapes
its own message, the very message which henceforth bears witness
to it throughout the whole world. For the words and sentences
in which the message is framed are formed by men who are imbued
with the fact of Christ. They never speak in order to communicate
their own wisdom or any theological or philosophical ideas.19
To this kind of thinking Barr responds, "the method of TWNT at places
comes nearer to offering idea-histories than word.-histories."20
Furthermore, Barr maintains that
Theological thought depends considerably on the degree to which
Theological thought of
the word becomes a technical term. . .
the type found in the NT has its characteristic linguistic expression not in the word individually but in the word-combination or
sentence. . . • The value of the context comes to be seen as something contributed by the word, and then it is read into the,yord
as its contribution where the context is in fact different."
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Barr's devestating criticism concludes at this point with the statement:
"A treatment of such combinations might come nearer to fulfilling the
general purpose of TWNT; but it would be less like what could be called
a dictionary."22
In Kittel's preface to his TWAT he indicates that his work stems
from the previous work done by the above mentioned Hermann Cremer and
also Julius dge1.23 It was this latter scholar who, in 1915, remarked:
The word in only the outward expression of the inner possession,
and this inner possession always remains the first thing. . .
The expression has to be judged,from within, just as it on the
other side leads to the inward.'
And certainly Barr is not one to let a comment like this go uncriticized.
He rebukes dgells comments with the words:
A general lexicon of language has to deal with semantics just
as a special lexicon of one writer or group must; it has to record usage of special groups if known; and it is extremely precarious to suggest that one must penetrate to "the inner world
of thought" in a way that the other does not.'
In short, the "whole Kftel-Kittel theory of lexicography must be judged
an erroneous one."26 It is not possible, according to Barr, for certain
religious expression to be lexicographically dealt with properly. Such
expressions like the "love of God" and the "mind of Christ" go far
beyond any lexicographer's ability to handle them. These kinds of
expressions and others like them "are not linguistic functional units
but formulations; they are not interchangeable like words, and do not
fit freely into contexts as words do."27
Now the reason that so many of Barr's criticisms are offered to the
reader is that the following quotation of his, which is to be understood
in light of the foregoing, does present a valid caution to those who
would unquestioningly assent to the method of contemporary Linguistic
Analysis:
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such failures can be traced to the philosophy of language which
allows a theological argument to do duty for a linguistic one, or
assumes that the linguistic facts will fit the patterns of theological relations. Such a misuse of argument arises, I repeat,
not from a deliberate intrusion of theology as such but from a
philosophy which believes the language of the Bible somehow to
reflect in its structure the pattern of the biblical events themselves. I think nevertheless that this ill-defined philosophy of
language has been followed and cultivated because it seemed to
serve and support the interests of certain types of theology. 28
This criticism has been taken up by another student of language analysis, Heinrich Ott, who was mentioned earlier in another context.29 Ott
claims, in much the same manner as would Barr, that we should not superimpose any particular schema upon the content of biblical material. In
his words, we ought not "interpret language from the outset in salvation-historical terms, nor attempt to press 'salvation-history' and the
particularity of biblical text into an important theory of language."3°
Moreover, another scholar has given his opinion of Gerhard Kittel1s
methodology. It is presented below since it relates directly to the
topic now under consideration and in general to the theme at large. John
Macquarrie has said that in Kittel:
the investigations have been directed to the history of the meanings of words. The question about the logical functions of words
and the kind of discourse in which they operate has been neglected.
•
•
These remarks are obviously related to some of the things
James Barr has said in his criticisms of certain aspects of biblical theology. The burden of his complaint has been that too much
attention is paid to single words, too little to the connected
discourse within which words get their significations. In stressing
the sentence as the minimal unit of discourse, Barr is saying precisely what Wittgenstein had said"
Before we consider what effect this matter of linguistics and semantics has upon Paul's meaning and use of the phrase, "the mind of Christ,"
it would be well to examine what some scholars have had to say in regard
to the nature of religious language.

CHAPTER V
THE NATURE OF RELIGIOUS LANGUAGE
In spite of the fact that the linguistic method has dominated the
English-speaking philosophic scene for nearly a half-century, the concern over language and its function "is not reflected alone in a single
philosophic method."1 Indeed, there have been a number of diverse
opinions expressed within the past decade to warrant such a statement.
The traces affecting the contemporary method of Linguistic Analysis have
been as diffuse as the schools of thought from which they emanate. It
will be the intention of this present chapter, thus, to try to collate
these expressions and traces into some recognizable pattern in an attempt to bring us to the point where we can speak more knowingly of St.
Paul's meaning and use of religious language.
First of all, it might be well to consider Crystal's comment regarding the social nature of language itself.
An important line of argument for the Christian is based on the
way a technique of language use is introduced into a society: it
is taught. A linguistic ability or habit is always learned; language in any form is not instinctive . . . speech . . . requires
a teacher.2
In another place he asserts that "Christianity is for all; it must therefore be comprehensible to all."3 Despite the fact that human language
is fraught with numerous inadequacies, we still should use it to speak
about God because it really is the only means we have. Moreover, it
still contains more than enough meaning and potential for the vast majority of its users."4 Let us now weigh the evidence of some of its users.
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William Blackstone, in his very profound study on the nature of
religious language, states that the religious sentences which provide
the biggest problem to one asking if there is religious knowledge are
"those which claim to impart knowledge but to which no falsifying evidence applies or which must be taken as analogically or symbolically
true."5 However, it must be said in the same breath that "the appeal
to so-called analogical or symbolical . . . function of these key religious sentences does not help us to discover their meaning."6 Thus
we still are left with the question of meaning unresolved. But "this
conclusion does not imply that those beliefs or attitudes have no value
in the lives of people."7
Dallas High would have us believe that we can become deluded into
thinking that
all sorts of schemes or views of religious speech are somehow
appropriate. . . One may further assume, although quite mistakingly, that the theologian, at lease in his saying things
religiously, remains unaffected by all this analysis since all
that is being added is an analysis aEd an understanding of the
meaning of what the theologian says.
But before we go too far afield with this matter of religious language
we should take into account what High says regarding this very concept..
He claims that religious use of language is different from religious
language precisely for the reason that there is "no 'language' peculiar to religion. Rather, it is the case that people make particular
and sometimes special uses of language which . . . may be considered
religious language."9 Yet for our purposes, the phrase "religious
language" is acceptable. If the writer could not use this phrase in
the manner he chooses then it would vitiate all the claims made up to
this point. Before examining the uniqueness of religious language
some brief comments on the nature of language itself will be made.
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There are a number of erroneous theories regarding the nature of
language. Highl° would mention four in particular: (a) the "referential" or "word-object theory" which affirms a one-to-one correspondence
of word to thing; (b) the "word-image theory" which holds that language
is composed of symbols that point to ideas and abstractions of the mind;
(c) the "behavioral theory" which states that the meaning of language is
a matter of a observational function of stimulus and response; and (d)
the "verifiability theory" which focuses on the public dimension of
meaning. These erroneous theories have much in common with one another.
First, it would appear that "language is discussed predominantly as a
detached, abstract, and theoretical object of critical investigation."11
Moreover, "it is commonly assumed that meaning is detached from the words
uttered and the understanding carried on between speakers and hearers in
the linguistic act."12
An interesting theory on the nature of language and the art of
communication is one propounded by John Macquarrie. The "discourse
situation"13 is comprised of basicarly four features: (a) a person
who speaks; (b) a person spoken to; (c) a thing spoken about; and (d)
something that is said about the thing. Macquarrie would contend that
there is a personal dimension which links one person to another. And
that which links the person(s) to the thing spoken about is intuition.
Both the erroneous concepts of language as well as the personal
dimension of language are useful to a more profound appreciation for
the nature of religious language. It will be helpful to bear these items
in mind as we now evaluate the nature of religious language itself.
There can be no doubt that religious language has a uniqueness about
it that escapes simple explanation. But scholars such as Frederick
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Ferre have attempted at least a partial interpretation? Ferre holds
that there are essentially five significant descriptive functions within the uniqueness of religious language: (a) there is a "worshipful
function" as put forth by J.J.C. Smart et al; (b) a "convictional function" as set forth by Willem Zuurdeeg; (c) an "oddness function" as described by Ramsey and Maclntyre; (d) a "reference range" as discussed by
Ian Crombie; and (e) the "significant situation" as put forth by Ferre
himself. Such concern over the uniqueness of religious language would
seem to result in having this kind of language restricted to a systematic
box when nothing like that should be the case.
Van Buren is one who is willing to grant that there is indeed a
uniqueness about religious language in the present situation but that
does not take into account the dynamic relationship between the language
of the believer and that of the writers of Scripture. Such a relationship is thus described:
Although the language of conversion differs from the language of
those in the Easter event, they function in a remarkably similar
manner. The difference between the two lies in the fact that the •
believer's expression of faith depends logically and historically
upon that of the apostles. That language of faith, whether that
of the first apostles or of a modern believer, contains an exclusive element: it claims the universal signifiwce of a particular, historical individual, Jesus of Nazareth.1'
Even within the realm of the uniqueness of religious language, Van Buren
claims "that the New Testament proclamation contains primarily statements whose logic is at least partly empirical."16 It should be noted
that Van Buren is quite cautious himself at this point in saying that
the "logic" (not "meaning") of the New Testament proclamation is only
partially empirical. In other words, he is not willing to grant that
religious statements are able to withstand the kind of verification
principles that modern analytic men would posit. Yet that does not
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mean that these or any other religious statements are not internally
verifiable. That is, they cannot be falsified on the basis of independent criteria whose realm of operation is completely extraneous to
that of statements of faith. This imposing of one set of criteria upon
that of another is the mistake the positivists made when they demanded
that all statements stand up under the rigors of scientific verification otherwise they were judged to be cognitively meaningless. Thus it
is entirely possible that religious statements do have a level of meaningfulness (as Ferre and others have tried to demonstrate); and this
degree of meaningfulness is established by the very nature of the thing
being expressed. That is, the language of religion has within itself
its own standards of verification.
This concern over the "verification" (or as some, would maintain,
the "falsification") principle has lead to what R. M. Hare would call
the concept of a "blik".17 For all practical purposes a "blik" is that
which refers to some kind of point of view on the part of a person which
may be either cognitively meaningful or nonverifiable but which is not '
within the realm of the disprovable. Robert Funk, then, sees this concept as implicit in Van Buren's understanding of religious language.
As he states:
Van Buren comes to language with understanding of language predominant in philosophical linguistic analysis: language is an
arbitrary system of signs, devised to convey information. Because
he takes this definition as his starting point, he is constrained
to opt for a noncognitive "blik" as the basis of faith.18
Moreover, Funk continues, "he is burdened with a deficient view of language . . . [and] he cannot accord secular man his final rights because
he has not grasped the interdependence of language and reality."19
Lest the reader get caught up in this discussion of the meaningfulness
of the concept of "blik" (much time and paper has been wasted over such
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an enterprise by scholars already) it should be noted what Antony Flew
has had to say. In Flew's opinion there is room for such a concept as
a "blik" in philosophy. However, "any attempt to analyse Christian rerelious utterances as expressions or affirmations of a blik rather than
as . . . assertions about the cosmos is fundamentally misguided."2°
What, then, can be said about religious assertions? Perhaps we can
look at the question from yet another point of view.
The principle of "eschatological verification" is an attempt to
provide some sort of substantiation where other concepts, methods or
theories have failed. According to Van Buren,
those who take this approach to the language of faith grant
that verification must apply to this language, but they argue
that this can only be done in the eschaton, in the final day
of the Kingdom. In the eschaton, we shall see clearly whether
or not faith as knowledge is correct. . . . Logically, however,
the statements of faith are in principle vqrifiable, and therefore, meaningful, as cognitive assertions.
Moreover, "to speak of verification as philosophers do presupposes certain empirical attitudes, and no one knows the empirical attitudes which
would be either possible in or appropriate to the eschaton."22 In theory,
the principle of "eschatological verification" could provide that basis
upon which theological and religious assertions might lay their claims.
But this principle has not found much of an audience in either the theological or the philosophical realm. In that so many philosophers and
theologians alike are skeptical of such a principles, Van Buren offers
what he considers to be a valid claim. He sees many similarities between
religious statements and moral assertions in that they are both neither
logically necessary nor empirical. Yet they do indeed have a use: "that
of guiding conduct."23 Although this does not appear to be a particularly profound claim, at least it implies something which Robert Funk
uses to describe the inherent quality of St. Paul's language: intention.
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Before we discuss the intentionality of Paul's language, let us
look briefly at what some noted Roman Catholic scholars have had to
say in regard to the nature of religious language.
In the year 1943, Pope Pius XII issued his Papal Encyclical,
Divino Afflante Sniritu, in which he stressed the purpose of biblical
research:
The interpreter must endeavor very carefully, overlooking no
light derived from recent research, to determine the personal
traits and background of the sacred writer, the age in which
he lived, the oral or writ n sources which he used, and his
way of expressing himself.
Taking very seriously this dictum, Michael Novak has said that there
are three general types of questions occupying the current attention
of Scripture students: (a) those concerning facts about manuscripts,
culture, and archeology; (b) those involving the meaning of a text; (c)
those concerned with the verification of that meaning.25 And Basil De
Pinto has offered what might serve as a useful introduction to the next
chapter or to any discussion concerning the nature of religious language.
According to De Pinto, we must not change the language, but learn to
find within it the expression of life which it contains, and to recognize the similarities it bears to our own experience. That is, we must
learn to realize that the Word of God is a living thing, addressed to us
as living creatures. He states:
There is no point in trying to avoid the fact that our Christian
vocabulary is quite proper and specific and is conditioned by the
course of revelation itself. It contains words, concepts, expressions which do not belong to any other segment of reality as we
know it. Our task is to adapt ourselves to this language . .
not to change it to suit ourselves.
This, then, is to be the attitude that modern men must have when they are
doing any kind of biblical research. This attitude, that language of the
Scripture is really speaking to us, is implicit in the following study.

CHAPTER VI
ST. PAUL'S MEANING AND USE OF RELIGIOUS LANGUAGE
The language within a Christian community is to a large degree
determined by the very nature of that community itself. James Barr
contends that the language within such a community depends to some
extent on the relation of the community "to the Bible as sacred scripture and on the commitment of the community to see its story as its own
and to familiarize itself with its style and expressions."' Moreover,
the Christian community not only tends to shape its own language and
the things which that language express in the light of what Scripture
says, but it also must take very seriously the fact that there may exist

what Barr calls a "cultural conflict between this community and the wider
-2Thus there are two forces
circle of those speaking the same language."
at work with regard to the relationship between a Christian community's
view toward the written Word of God: (a) its awn use of religious language; (b) the world's use of a language which contains the same words.
What this study proposes to do, then, is look more closely at the
language which Paul uses in writing to the Corinthians to see how the
two forces mentioned above are at work in that particular community.
Although it will not be explicitly stated, the reader is encouraged
throughout to regard the words Paul uses in his letter as the actual
words being spoken today. That is, in conformity with De Pinto's statement above,3 the reader is asked to regard himself as a member of the
Christian community to which Paul is addressing the words of I.Cor. 2:16.
In so doing, he will better envision the force of such religious language.
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In that the language used throughout the entire First Epistle to
the Corinthians is so diverse (due to the complexity of the situation
and the nature of specific problems), it will be necessary to view just
a brief phrase in light of its immediate context. This does not mean,
however, that the full thrust of Paul's language will be diminished.
For the remarks made will be specific to the paragraph (2:6-16) without
losing sight of the entire letter's general content.
Throughout the epistle, but especially in this part (2:6-16), Paul
is hampered by the fact that he must use the word wisdom (sophia) in
two senses (Barrett).4 In the bad sense, Paul uses the word to denote
the simple, human arguments which in themselves are not evil. These
arguments do become evil once they give over to understanding truth in
terms of human standards rather than those which are given in Christ
who has been crucified. In the good sense, Paul contends that the word
of the cross is really the wisdom of God. But more important it is actually the wisdom of God which must be understood as God acting through
"the wise plan of salvation."5 This discussion of wisdom, then, should
cast some light upon the paragraph now under discussion.
There is indeed a Christian wisdom. And there is also a very distinct difference between infant and mature, natural and spiritual,
Christians. Thus Paul can speak (2:6) wisdom to those who are spiritually mature. But it is to be noted that the type of wisdom Paul speaks
about in I Cor. 2:5 is in marked contrast with that type of wisdom spoken
about in I Cor. 2:7.
The sophia which Paul speaks is not the sophia of this age or of
the powers of this age (2:6). No (alla), the sophia we speak is
the sophia of God (2:7), for God reveals it to us (2:10a). It is
the sophia by which we identify the Lord of glory as the Crucified
(2:8); we have received the sophia (nneuma) of God in order that
we may discern the gifts given us by God. . . . We do not speak
sophia, therefore, in language informed by human sophia, but in
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language informed by the Spirit (sophia of God). . . . For the
Spirit not only confers wisdom and spiritual gifts, b9t it stands
in critical judgment upon wisdom and spiritual gifts.
The earlier antithesis, dynamis/sophia, is retained in 2:5 (Funk),
however, where Paul comes at last to speak of faith, "his proclamation
gives presence to the crucified Christ in order that their faith may
rest on the power of God rather than on the sophia of men."7 Furthermore, it may be observed that
the underlying theme of language is carried further in 2:6ff.
"But (de) we do speak (laloumen) a kind of sophia but (de) a
sophia. . . ." The sophia which Paul speaks is the sophia of
God (1:24), which is the word of the cross (of. 1:30).
The fundamental contrast for Paul is between sophia logou (wisdom
of the word) and logos staurou (word of the cross). In light of this
it becomes evident that Paul is speaking about two types of languages
(Funk). But at the same time it should be noted that Paul is not talking about two types of christologies: (a) a christology of the cross;
(b) a christology of wisdom.
This view that Paul sets a stauros christology over against a
sophia christology in what follows is therefore only superficially correct. It.is more than a dispute over opinions about
Jesus Christ. Is a dispute about faith itself, and Paul's concern is therefore not so much to correct a faulty christology but
to bring the Christ to stand. By bringing the Crucified anew into
language Paul hopes to confront the Corinthians again with the
word of faith, with the word that is power, in which case the need
for controversy will have ceased. . . . For to bring the Christ
to stand means to flesh him out within their horizons. And if
within their horizons, within the language that is their home.9
It becomes clear from the above that, for Funk, Paul's main concern in
2:6-16 is Christ the Crucified. Indeed, Paul attaches sophia precisely to the Crucified which produces a radical change in term as the
Corinthians understood it (Funk). Paul identifies the Lord of Glory
as the Crucified, which proves to be a stumbling block to the Corinthians. At this point, Paul is "deforming Corinthian language in the
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interest of gaining a hearing of the word of the cross. It follows
that one must inquire closely after the intentionality of the text."1°
In light of this, Funk offers us a quite meaningful definition of
intentionality. That is, in his opinion, intentionality is to be distinguished from purpose or aim as generally understood. Moreover, it
"refers to the Iworldlheld in view by the writer or speaker, but it
should also be taken to imply a locus from which that "world" is seen."11
For the most part, Paul is concerned about the proclamation of the
Gospel and how that proclamation takes effect among his readers. In
this regard, Paul moves between two poles: "(a) what the proclamation
intends . . .; (b) the way in which that proclamation is being heard."12
Paul thus juxtaposes what is to be heard and the hearing of that thing
within a language that brings each to bear on the other. It remains,
therefore, that "the question of intentionality must . . . be raised
with respect to what the text fixes attention on, its lobjecti."13 Now
when we inquire of Paul what he intends, it becomes evident that he intends Jesus the Crucified as the ground of faith. Thus it is"for this
reason that the exegete must take as his proper concern the intentionality of language in view of its linguistic horizons."14
With regard to the language of the Corinthians, Funk maintains
that they "did not hear a phrase or even a sentence in isolation, but
were brought under the impact of the whole."15 Moreover, it is clear
that Paul makes an effort "to bring the Corinthians, via their own
language, within hearing range of the eschatological-critical power of
the word."16 How he does this is simply through a special use of religious language. That is,
old, worn-out expressions were rejuvenated and given new lustre.
. . . Words expressing servility, ignominy and sin were washed
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clean, elevated, and baptized with new meaning. . . . This
mighty, transfiguring, creative force within Christianity is
persuasive throughout the language of the entire New Testament.
Moreover, as Crystal sees it, "the criterion of a spiritual (or typical)
meaning is quite distinct from the literal meaning of a text."18 He
further states that "each text must be considered in the light of its
special purpose within its temporal and geographical context, if the
nature of the permanent religious truths is to be at all apprehended."19
In light of the above comments, then, we take a more critical look at
the specific context of I Cor. 2:6-16.
It should be made clear that the context of 2:6-16 must be seen as
an expression of Paul's own theological position.20
That Paul must have had an esoteric wisdom teaching entirely
separate from his kerygma; that one must judge he drew this
teaching directly from Jewish and Christian apocalyptic-wisdom
theology, and that the main motifs revealed ih these verses,
so far from indicating a concession t foreign ideas, are consistent with his theology as a whole.'
Moreover, it is evident that at this point Paul is involved in defending
himself and the Gospel which he has proclaimed. In regard to this
defense, Paul feels it necessary to insist that he does possess a certain type of wisdom. And he contrasts his wisdom with the wisdom of
this age, which can be nothing but the wisdom the Corinthians have boasted as possessing. I Cor. 2:6-16 is thus a personal defense by Paul, but
it is embedded in the midst of his attack on one disrupting element in
the church (Scroggs).
In this section it is no longer kerygma against sophia, but God's
wisdom against human wisdom. The issue is still that of the proclamation of Christian teaching but on an entirely different level.
Here the contrast is clearly one of content, not of form. . . .
The emphasis is now on what the wisdom is, what it is the rulers
of the age did t know, the things (i.e., the content) God has revealed to Paul.
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Exegetically, it is to be seen that 2:16a recapitulates 2:11,
Paul has reserved his scriptural quotation until the end of the section
as a climax (Scroggs). But the similarity in form of 2:11a and 2:16a
suggests that Paul is 2:11a already had in mind his later use of Isaiah
40:13. The quotation fits Paul's purpose well. It allows him both to
summarize the inaccessibility of God's wisdom and to set up his own affirmation in 2:16b. It is perhaps important to note that the Hebrew
of Isaiah 40:13 has rush, which the LXX translates by nous (and only
here of all appearances of ruah). Scroggs thus maintains that "for
this context, for reasons obscure to us, he preferred the LXX."23 Moreover, the tis gar egni5 is proof of what Paul has just claimed for the
pneumatikos (Robertson/Plummer). Here it is to be noted that 2:16
omits the phrase from the LXX, kai tis autou symboulos, which is included in Romans 11:34. However, Romans 11:34 omits the phrase hos symbibasei auton, from the LXX which is contained in 2:16. In either case,
the respective omission does not appear to be that significant.
Regarding the phrase nous kyriou, in 2:16a, it is to be noted that•
here nous corresponds to the LXXIs rendering of rush as pneuma (Robertson/
Plummer). In light of this, we note that "in God, nous and pneuma are

identical . . .`but not in aspect, nous being suitable to denote the
Divine knowledge or counsel, pneuma the Divine action either in creation
or in grace."24
Concerning the phrase in 2:16b; hemeis de noun Christou echomen,
"we have this by agency of the Spirit of God; and the mind of the Spirit
of God is known to the Searcher of hearts."25 As for the actual use of
nous in this case, much can be said both in terms of theological and
philosophical categories.
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Paul nowhere else uses nous in such away to refer to God or Christ,
as pneuma usually does (Scroggs). Moreover, "the renewal of the nous is
an important concept for Paul, but it always remains for him the human
mind or inner man."26 What Scroggs means by this kind of statement
might become more evident once we consider the philosophical temper of
the first century.27
The Stoic philosophy maintained that the origin of the knowledge
of God is to be sought in man himself. Knowledge of God is achieved
through the awakening of manes innate knowledge of God. For the Stoics,
logos is an important word; the logos of the individual man knows the
logos that permeates the whole kosmos.
In the Hermetic traditions, the principal doctrine concerning God
is that his nature is nous. As Bertil GArtner states:
Because the Father of all things consists of Light and Life, man,
through knowing himself, identifies himself as qualitatively akin
tith Father, the Nous. The word used in this context is not pneuma
but nous, and the la4er denotes man's qualitative prerequisite for
the knowledge of God.'"
Philo's theology, or rather philosophy, stresses that "man's nous
could not by its own power attain to knowledge of God. God had to reveal himself to the human reason."29
But perhaps the most influential form of philosophical thoughtconstruct was that implicit in first century Gnosticism.. Although
Gnosticism is the general title given to many groups each of which expressed 'its system of thought in much the same manner, it is felt that
such gnostic groups expounded a very complicated metaphysical dualism.
Broadly speaking, however, the gnostics of the first century held that
man consists of matter, soul, and pneuma. It was this pneuma which represented a portion of the divine essence.
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C. Freeman Sleeper contends that Gnostic terminology is introduced
in 2:6-16 "in order to challenge the Corinthian anthropology --- not by
trying to substitute a different anthropology, but by grounding their
own language in the event of the Cross."3° Thus it would appear that
Sleeper is saying much the same thing that had been said earlier:31 that
Paul is using the Corinthian language in order to get his own particular
point of view across. That Paul uses the words prevalent in first century theology and philosophy there can be no doubt. That Paul means
the same thing by these words is another question: a question which has
involved the entire content of this study.
One who would assert that Paul is not intending comparable meanings
for comparable words is Johannes Behm. He states that "there is no need
to suppose that Paul is equating nous and rneuma after the manner of
Hellenistic mysticism."32 He also mentions that nous in the New Testament has the meanings: mind, disposition, practical reason (in the sense
of moral consciousness as it determines man's will and action), understanding, and thought, judgment or resolve. Behm would hold that "resolve" is the kind of thing Paul intended when he used the word "mind"
in 2:16a. As he states, "the context points to the hidden plan of salvation which is now manifested."33 Moreover, "the sharp contrast of
meaning which the word undergoes in v. 16b . . . represents a play on
the word, which now bears Ella sense . . . intindl.04
At the other end of the spectrum is GArtner who contends that in
the first century there were different ways to gain knowledge of God.
There was a lower way which involved man's reason and a more perfect
way which was the gift from God. This kind of idea was important in
New Testament times in that
it would be a surprise if the principle had not been used in
Early Church as it is such a fundamental idea in Hellenistic
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teaching and many New Testament passages contain examples of
the Hellenization of Jewish and Christian ideas.35
Thus, for GBrtner, it would appear that Paul used the term nous with
this background in mind, but used it in a Christian sense and context.
Paul, therefore, had "to distinguish between the Christian and the
natural man, the non-Christian, and apply the principle only to the
Christian."36
Whatever may be said about the influence, either direct or nondirect, of Hellenistic thought-patterns upon the language of St. Paul,
Barrett contends that Paul does not share these gnostic convictions.
He holds, rather, that for Paul "there is no profounder truth than the
word of the cross, and only the Spirit can of himself know and then
communicate, the truth about God."37
Finally, Robertson and Plummer maintain that the noun Christou is
the mind of Christ which is "the correlative of His Spirit, which is the
Spirit of God. . . and this mind belongs to those who are His by virtue
of their vital union with Him."38 Moreover, "the emphatic hemeis . . .
serves to associate all oneumatikoi with the Apostle, and also all his
readers, so far as they are . . . among the hoi sozomenoi."39 And Funk
would conclude that the phrase,noun Christou, indicates that Paul is
under the judgment of the Lord through the word of the cross.°

CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION
Paul Van Buren has said that the Gospel is good news of a free man
who has set other men free; men who have been °liberated . . . [and] are
'in Christ,' which is to say that their understanding of themselves and
their lives . . . is determined by their understanding of Jesus."' Such
men about whom and to whom Paul was talking no doubt "knew" what he meant
when he said that "we have the mind of Christ."
The purpose of this chapter, then, is not to dray the reader to a
conclusion as such. Rather, it is our intention to bring the reader to
an understanding in light of the material presented in the previous discussion regarding the relationship between the language of the New Testament and the principles of contemporary Linguistic Analysis. The reader,
moreover, should also bear in mind that Van Buren said in regard to the
aim of his own study:
We explored the logic of the language of the New Testament authors
concerning the man Jesus of Nazareth. Our aim has been to discover the meaning of their words and to find appropriate and clear
words with which to express that meaning today, asking after a
functional equivalence tetween,a contemporary Christology and the
language of the New Testament.'
Beyond this statement regarding the aim of putting the language of the
New Testament into contemporary words which are understandable to modern
man, there is the method of Linguistic Analysis which can help to make
that task practicable. In this respect, Van Buren has said that Linguistic Analysis "exposes the function of language in just those areas on
which modern theology seeks to shed light: the world in which the 'average'
Christian finds himself."3 FUrthermore, theologianscancemmedwith the

"relevance' of the Gospel for ordinary believers . . . should be particulary open to a method of analysis which appeals so frequently to the
ordinary use of language."4 He concludes that Linguistic Analysis
shows the various empirical footings of different theological
assertsions, and it suggests ways in which the meaning of apparently transempirical psects of the language of Christian
faith may be understood.,
Finally, no study of New Testament language in light of contemporary Linguistic Analysis is complete without the insightful comment of
Luis Alonso-Sch8kel, "a little philosophy of language would be an excellent addition to clerical education."6
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